# Algorithmic Logic-Based Verification with SeaHorn

Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Arie Gurfinkel with Teme Kahsai and Jorge A. Navas

based on joint work with Anvesh Komuravelli, and Nikolaj Bjørner

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
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
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## **Automated Software Analysis**



Software Model Checking with Predicate Abstraction e.g., Microsoft's SDV



Abstract Interpretation with Numeric Abstraction

e.g., ASTREE, Polyspace






Turing, 1936: "undecidable"

How can one check a routine in the sense of making sure that it is right?


programmer should make a number of definite assertions which can be checked individually, and from which the correctness of the whole programme easily follows.



## Three-Layers of a Program Verifier

### Compiler

- compiles surface syntax a target machine
- embodies syntax with semantics




#### **Verification Condition Generator**


- transforms a program and a property to a condition in logic
- employs different abstractions, refinements, proof-search strategies, etc.

### Automated Theorem Prover / Reasoning Engine

- discharges verification conditions
- general purpose constraint solver
- SAT, SMT, Abstract Interpreter, Temporal Logic Model Checker,...



verification



http://seahorn.github.io

### **SeaHorn Verification Framework**





Arie Gurfinkel
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University

Temesghen Kahsai
Carnegie Mellon University
NASA Ames

Jorge A. Navas
SGT
NASA Ames

### The Plan

Introduction

Architecture and Usage

**Demonstration** 

Constrained Horn Clauses as an Intermediate Representation

From Programs to Logic

generating verification conditions


Program Transformations for Verification

Solving Constrained Horn Clauses

synthesizing inductive invariants and procedure summaries

Conclusion

### **SeaHorn Verification Framework**



### Key Features

- LLVM front-end(s)
- Constrained Horn Clauses to represent Verification Conditions
- Comparable to state-of-the-art tools at SV-COMP'15

#### Goals

- be a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker
- be a framework for experimenting and developing CHC-based verification

### **Related Tools**

#### **CPAChecker**

- Custom front-end for C
- Abstract Interpretation-inspired verification engine
- Predicate abstraction, invariant generation, BMC, k-induction

#### SMACK / Corral

- LLVM-based front-end
- Reduces C verification to Boogie
- Corral / Q verification back-end based on Bounded Model Checking with SMT

#### **UFO**

- LLVM-based front-end (partially reused in SeaHorn)
- Combines Abstract Interpretation with Interpolation-Based Model Checking
- (no longer actively developed)

### SeaHorn Philosophy

#### Build a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker

- useful to "average" users
  - user-friendly, efficient, trusted, certificate-producing, ...
- useful to researchers in verification
  - modular design, clean separation between syntax, semantics, and logic, ...

#### Stand on the shoulders of giants

- reuse techniques from compiler community to reduce verification effort
  - SSA, loop restructuring, induction variables, alias analysis, ...
  - static analysis and abstract interpretation
- reduce verification to logic
  - verification condition generation
  - Constrained Horn Clauses

### Build reusable logic-based verification technology

"SMT-LIB" for program verification

### SeaHorn Usage


> sea pf FILE.c
Outputs sat for unsafe (has counterexample); unsat for safe
Additional options

- --cex=trace.xml outputs a counter-example in SV-COMP'15 format
- --show-invars displays computed invariants
- --track={reg,ptr,mem} track registers, pointers, memory content
- --step={large,small} verification condition step-semantics
  - small == basic block, large == loop-free control flow block
- --inline inline all functions in the front-end passes

#### Additional commands

- sea smt generates CHC in extension of SMT-LIB2 format
- sea clp -- generates CHC in CLP format (under development)
- sea lfe-smt generates CHC in SMT-LIB2 format using legacy front-end

## **Verification Pipeline**



# **DEMO**

## From Programming to Modeling

Extend C programming language with 3 modeling features

#### **Assertions**

assert(e) – aborts an execution when e is false, no-op otherwise

```
void assert (_Bool b) { if (!b) abort(); }
```

#### Non-determinism

nondet\_int() – returns a non-deterministic integer value

```
int nondet_int () { int x; return x; }
```

#### **Assumptions**

assume(e) – "ignores" execution when e is false, no-op otherwise

```
void assume ( Bool e) { while (!e) ; }
```

**Constrained Horn Clauses** 

# INTERMEDIATE REPRESENTATION

## **Constrained Horn Clauses (CHC)**

A Constrained Horn Clause (CHC) is a FOL formula of the form


$$\forall V . (\phi \land p_1[X_1] \land ... \land p_n[X_n] \rightarrow h[X]),$$

### where

- A is a background theory (e.g., Linear Arithmetic, Arrays, Bit-Vectors, or combinations of the above)
- ullet  $\phi$  is a constrained in the background theory A
- p<sub>1</sub>, ..., p<sub>n</sub>, h are n-ary predicates
- p<sub>i</sub>[X] is an application of a predicate to first-order terms

## **Example Horn Encoding**

int x=1; int y=0; while (\*) { x = x + y;y = y + 1; $assert(x \ge y);$ 



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$$\begin{array}{l} \langle 1 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_0. \\ \langle 2 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_1(x,y) \leftarrow \\ \ \mathsf{p}_0, x = 1, y = 0. \\ \langle 3 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_2(x,y) \leftarrow \mathsf{p}_1(x,y) \ . \\ \langle 4 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_3(x,y) \leftarrow \mathsf{p}_1(x,y) \ . \\ \langle 5 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_1(x',y') \leftarrow \\ \ \mathsf{p}_2(x,y), \\ x' = x + y, \\ y' = y + 1. \\ \langle 6 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_4 \leftarrow (x \geq y), \mathsf{p}_3(x,y). \\ \langle 7 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_{\mathsf{err}} \leftarrow (x < y), \mathsf{p}_3(x,y). \\ \langle 8 \rangle \ \mathsf{p}_4 \leftarrow \mathsf{p}_4. \\ \langle 9 \rangle \ \bot \leftarrow \mathsf{p}_{\mathsf{err}}. \end{array}$$

## **CHC Terminology**

body constraint

Rule

$$h[X] \leftarrow p_1[X_1], \dots, p_n[X_n], \phi$$

head

Query

false 
$$\leftarrow p_1[X_1], ..., p_n[X_n], \phi$$
.

**Fact** 

$$h[X] \leftarrow \phi$$
.

Linear CHC

$$h[X] \leftarrow p[X_1], \phi.$$

Non-Linear CHC

$$h[X] \leftarrow p_1[X_1],..., p_n[X_n], \phi.$$
  
for  $n > 1$ 

## **CHC Satisfiability**


A **model** of a set of clauses  $\Pi$  is an interpretation of each predicate  $p_i$  that makes all clauses in  $\Pi$  valid

A set of clauses is **satisfiable** if it has a model, and is unsatisfiable otherwise

A model is **A-definable**, it each  $p_i$  is definable by a formula  $\psi_i$  in A

## **Example Horn Encoding**

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{int } x=1;\\ \text{int } y=0;\\ \text{while } (*) \ \{\\ x=x+y;\\ y=y+1;\\ \}\\ \text{assert} (x\geq y); \end{array}$ 



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$$\begin{array}{l} \langle 1 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_0}. \\ \langle 2 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_1}(x,y) \leftarrow \\ \ \mathsf{p_0}, x = 1, y = 0. \\ \langle 3 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_2}(x,y) \leftarrow \mathsf{p_1}(x,y) \ . \\ \langle 4 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_3}(x,y) \leftarrow \mathsf{p_1}(x,y) \ . \\ \langle 5 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_1}(x',y') \leftarrow \\ \ \mathsf{p_2}(x,y), \\ \ x' = x + y, \\ \ y' = y + 1. \\ \langle 6 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_4} \leftarrow (x \geq y), \mathsf{p_3}(x,y). \\ \langle 7 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_{err}} \leftarrow (x < y), \mathsf{p_3}(x,y). \\ \langle 8 \rangle \ \mathsf{p_4} \leftarrow \mathsf{p_4}. \\ \langle 9 \rangle \ \bot \leftarrow \mathsf{p_{err}}. \end{array}$$

### Relationship between CHC and Verification

A program satisfies a property iff corresponding CHCs are satisfiable

satisfiability-preserving transformations == safety preserving

Models for CHC correspond to verification certificates

inductive invariants and procedure summaries

Unsatisfiability (or derivation of FALSE) corresponds to counterexample

• the resolution derivation (a path or a tree) is the counterexample

CAVEAT: In SeaHorn the terminology is reversed

- SAT means there exists a counterexample a BMC at some depth is SAT
- UNSAT means the program is safe BMC at all depths are UNSAT

# FROM PROGRAMS TO **CLAUSES**

## **Hoare Triples**

A Hoare triple {Pre} P {Post} is valid iff every terminating execution of P that starts in a state that satisfies *Pre* ends in a state that satisfies *Post* 

### Inductive Loop Invariant

$$\mathsf{Pre} \Rightarrow \mathsf{Inv}$$

$$Inv \land \neg C \Rightarrow Post$$

{Pre} while C do Body {Post}

### **Function Application**

$$(Pre \land p=a) \Rightarrow P$$

$$\{P\} \text{ Body}_F \{Q\} \qquad (Q \land p,r=a,b) \Rightarrow \text{Post}$$

$$\{Pre\} b = F(a) \{Post\}$$

#### Recursion

$$\{Pre\}\ b = F(a)\ \{Post\}\ \vdash \{Pre\}\ Body_F\ \{Post\}$$

$$\{Pre\} b = F(a) \{Post\}$$

### Weakest Liberal Pre-Condition

Validity of Hoare triples is reduced to FOL validity by applying a predicate transformer

Dijkstra's weakest liberal pre-condition calculus [Dijkstra'75]

weakest pre-condition ensuring that executing P ends in Post

{Pre} P {Post} is valid

 $\Leftrightarrow$  Pre  $\Rightarrow$  wlp (P, Post)

## A Simple Programming Language

```
Prog ::= def Main(x) { body<sub>M</sub> }, ..., def P (x) { body<sub>P</sub> }
body ::= stmt (; stmt)*
stmt ::= x = E \mid assert(E) \mid assume(E) \mid
           while E do S \mid y = P(E) \mid
           L:stmt | goto L
                                            (optional)
 := expression over program variables
Ε
```

## Horn Clauses by Weakest Liberal Precondition

```
Prog ::= def Main(x) { body<sub>M</sub> }, ..., def P (x) { body<sub>P</sub> }
wlp (x=E, Q) = let x=E in Q
wlp (assert(E), Q) = E \wedge Q
wlp (assume(E), Q) = E \rightarrow Q
wlp (while E do S, Q) = I(w) \land
                 \forall w : ((I(w) \land E) \rightarrow wlp (S, I(w))) \land ((I(w) \land \neg E) \rightarrow Q))
wlp (y = P(E), Q) = p_{pre}(E) \land (\forall r. p(E, r) \rightarrow Q[r/y])
```

```
ToHorn (def P(x) {S}) = wlp (x0=x; assume(p_{pre}(x)); S, p(x0, ret))
ToHorn (Prog) = wlp (Main(), true) \land \forall \{P \in Prog\}. ToHorn (P)
```

## Example of a WLP Horn Encoding

```
{Pre: y≥ 0}
X_0 = X;
 y_0 = y;
 while y > 0 do
   x = x+1;
   y = y-1;
{Post: x=x_0+y_0}
```




```
C1: I(x,y,x,y) \leftarrow y \ge 0.
C2: I(x+1,y-1,x_0,y_0) \leftarrow I(x,y,x_0,y_0), y>0.
C3: false \leftarrow I(x,y,x<sub>0</sub>,y<sub>0</sub>), y\leq0, x\neqx<sub>0</sub>+y<sub>0</sub>
```

 $\{y \ge 0\} P \{x = x_{old} + y_{old}\}$  is **true** iff the query  $C_3$  is **satisfiable** 

## **Example Horn Encoding**

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathrm{int}\ x=1;\\ \mathrm{int}\ y=0;\\ \mathrm{while}\ (*)\ \{\\ x=x+y;\\ y=y+1;\\ \}\\ \mathrm{assert}(x\geq y); \end{array}$ 



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
## From CFG to Cut Point Graph

A *Cut Point Graph* hides (summarizes) fragments of a control flow graph by (summary) edges

Vertices (called, *cut points*) correspond to *some* basic blocks

An edge between cut-points *c* and *d* summarizes all finite (loop-free) executions from *c* to *d* that do not pass through any other cut-points


## **Cut Point Graph Example**




**Mixed Semantics** 

## PROGRAM TRANSFORMATION

## **Deeply nested assertions**



## **Deeply nested assertions**



Counter-examples are long Hard to determine (from main) what is relevant

### Mixed Semantics

#### Stack-free program semantics combining:

- operational (or small-step) semantics
  - i.e., usual execution semantics
- natural (or big-step) semantics: function summary [Sharir-Pnueli 81]
  - $-(\sigma, \sigma) \in ||f||$  iff the execution of f on input state  $\sigma$  terminates and results in state  $\sigma'$
- some execution steps are big, some are small

#### Non-deterministic executions of function calls


- update top activation record using function summary, or
- enter function body, forgetting history records (i.e., no return!)

### Preserves reachability and non-termination

<u>Theorem:</u> Let K be the operational semantics, K<sup>m</sup> the stack-free semantics, and L a program location. Then,

 $K \models EF (pc=L) \Leftrightarrow K^m \models EF (pc=L)$  and  $K \models EG (pc \neq L) \Leftrightarrow K^m \models EG (pc \neq L)$ 

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## **Mixed Semantics as Program Transformation**

```
main \; () \\ p1 \; (); \; p1 \; (); \\ assert \; (c1); \\ p1 \; () \\ p2 \; (); \\ assert \; (c2); \\ p2 \; () \\ assert \; (c3);
```

## Mixed Semantics

```
\begin{array}{lll} \textit{main}_{new} \; () & \textit{p1}_{entry} \; : & \textit{p1}_{new} \; () \\ & \text{if (*) goto } p1_{entry}; & \text{if (*) goto } p2_{entry}; & \textit{p2}_{new} \; (); \\ & \text{else } p1_{new} \; (); & \text{else } p2_{new} \; (); & \text{assume } (c2); \\ & \text{if (*) goto } p1_{entry}; & \text{if } (\neg c2) \; \text{goto } error; & p2_{new} \; () \\ & \text{else } p1_{new} \; (); & p2_{entry} \; : & \text{assume } (c3); \\ & \text{if } (\neg c1) \; \text{goto } error; & \text{if } (\neg c3) \; \text{goto } error; \\ & \text{assume (false)}; & \text{assume (false)}; \\ & & error \; : \; \text{assert (false)}; \\ \end{array}
```

## **Mixed Semantics: Summary**

#### Every procedure is inlined at most once

- in the worst case, doubles the size of the program
- can be restricted to only inline functions that directly or indirectly call errror()

#### Easy to implement at compiler level

- create "failing" and "passing" versions of each function
- reduce "passing" functions to returning paths
- in main(), introduce new basic block bb.F for every failing function F(), and call failing.F in bb.F
- inline all failing calls
- replace every call to F to non-deterministic jump to bb.F or call to passing F

#### Increases context-sensitivity of context-insensitive analyses

- context of failing paths is explicit in main (because of inlining)
- enables / improves many traditional analyses

# **SOLVING CHC WITH SMT**

## **Programs, Cexs, Invariants**

A program  $P = (V, Init, \rho, Bad)$ 

• Notation:  $\mathcal{F}(X) = \exists u : (X \land \rho) \lor Init$ 


P is UNSAFE if and only if there exists a number N s.t.

$$Init(v_0) \land \left(\bigwedge_{i=0}^{N-1} \rho(v_i, v_{i+1})\right) \land Bad(v_N) \not\Rightarrow \bot$$

P is SAFE if and only if there exists a safe inductive invariant Inv s.t.

$$Init(u) \Rightarrow Inv(u)$$
 
$$Inv(u) \land \rho(u,v) \Rightarrow Inv(v)$$
 Inductive 
$$Inv(u) \Rightarrow \neg Bad(u)$$
 Safe

## Verification by Evolving Approximations



## IC3/PDR Algorithm Overview

bounded safety

**Input**: Safety problem  $\langle Init(X), Tr(X, X'), Bad(X) \rangle$ 

$$F_0 \leftarrow Init ; N \leftarrow 0 \text{ repeat}$$

$$\mathbf{G} \leftarrow \text{PdrMkSafe}([F_0, \dots, F_N], Bad)$$

if G = [] then return Reachable;

$$\forall 0 \leq i \leq N \cdot F_i \leftarrow \mathbf{G}[i]$$

$$F_0, \ldots, F_N \leftarrow \text{PdrPush}([F_0, \ldots, F_N])$$

if 
$$\exists 0 \leq i < N \cdot F_i = F_{i+1}$$
 then return  $Unreg$  hable;


$$N \leftarrow N + 1; F_N \leftarrow \emptyset$$


until  $\infty$ ;

strengthen result

#### **PdrMkSafe**


## **IC3/PDR** in Pictures





#### **PdrPush**


## **IC3/PDR** in Pictures







### IC3/PDR in Pictures



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## **Spacer: Solving CHC in Z3**

#### Spacer: solver for SMT-constrained Horn Clauses


- stand-alone implementation in a fork of Z3
- http://bitbucket.org/spacer/code

#### Support for Non-Linear CHC

- model procedure summaries in inter-procedural verification conditions
- model assume-guarantee reasoning
- uses MBP to under-approximate models for finite unfoldings of predicates
- uses MAX-SAT to decide on an unfolding strategy

#### Supported SMT-Theories

- Best-effort support for arbitrary SMT-theories
  - data-structures, bit-vectors, non-linear arithmetic
- Full support for Linear arithmetic (rational and integer)
- Quantifier-free theory of arrays
  - only quantifier free models with limited applications of array equality



## **CRAB:** Cornucopia of Abstractions

A library of abstract domains build on top of NASA Ikos (Inference Kernel for Open Static Analyzers)

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A language-independent intermediate representation

#### Many abstract domains


- intervals (with congruences) (with uninterpreted functions)
- zones, dbms, octagons
- pointer analysis with offsets
- array analysis with smashing

#### Fixpoint iteration library

- precise interleaving between widening and narrowing
- extensible with thresholds

#### Efficient reusable data-structure

simple API for integrating new abstract domains



# **RESULTS**

#### **SV-COMP 2015**

# 4<sup>th</sup> Competition on Software Verification held (here!) at TACAS 2015 Goals

- Provide a snapshot of the state-of-the-art in software verification to the community.
- Increase the visibility and credits that tool developers receive.
- Establish a set of benchmarks for software verification in the community.

#### Participants:


 Over 22 participants, including most popular Software Model Checkers and Bounded Model Checkers

#### Benchmarks:

- C programs with error location (programs include pointers, structures, etc.)
- Over 6,000 files, each 2K 100K LOC
- Linux Device Drivers, Product Lines, Regressions/Tricky examples
- http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2015/benchmarks.php



## Results for DeviceDriver category



## **Detecting Buffer Overflow in Auto-pilot software**


Show absence of Buffer Overflows in

paparazzi and mnav autopilots



Automatically instrument buffer accesses with runtime checks Use SeaHorn to validate that run-time checks never fail

- somewhat slower than pure abstract interpretation
- much more precise!



#### Conclusion

#### SeaHorn (<a href="http://seahorn.github.io">http://seahorn.github.io</a>)

- a state-of-the-art Software Model Checker
- LLVM-based front-end
- CHC-based verification engine
- a framework for research in logic-based verification



#### The future

- making SeaHorn useful to users of verification technology
  - counterexamples, build integration, property specification, proofs, etc.
- targeting many existing CHC engines
  - specialize encoding and transformations to specific engines
  - communicate results between engines
- richer properties
  - termination, liveness, synthesis



#### **Contact Information**

Arie Gurfinkel, Ph. D.

Sr. Researcher

CSC/SSD

Telephone: +1 412-268-5800

Email: info@sei.cmu.edu

Web

www.sei.cmu.edu

www.sei.cmu.edu/contact.cfm

U.S. Mail

Software Engineering Institute

**Customer Relations** 

4500 Fifth Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2612

USA

**Customer Relations** 

Email: info@sei.cmu.edu

Telephone: +1 412-268-5800

SEI Phone: +1 412-268-5800

SEI Fax: +1 412-268-6257